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Asset-based loans are a form of secured lending in which the amount of 
the loan is based primarily on the value and quality of the collateral that the 
borrower pledges to its lender. These loans typically are based on a 
borrower’s accounts receivable, inventory, equipment or other asset that can 
be valued by an independent authority, such as an appraiser. An asset-based 
lender may be asked from time to time to extend loans to a borrower based 
on inventory consisting of goods bearing a trademark owned by a third party 
(“Trademarked Inventory”). This paper examines the issues that arise when 
the borrower is either a manufacturer or authorized distributor of 
Trademarked Inventory for the trademark owner (sometimes referred to 
herein as the “licensor”).1 
As discussed below, a trademark owner may have the right to preclude 
the sale of Trademarked Inventory (or claim damages due to any sales) 
following the termination of a license or distribution agreement, or upon the 
bankruptcy of the borrower or trademark owner. This right may be based on 
claims of trademark infringement, breach of contract, or the United States 
Bankruptcy Code as it pertains to executory intellectual property licenses. 
Understanding the basis for and scope of the trademark owner’s rights, the 
potential defenses that a borrower and its lender may have, and the steps that 
both the borrower and lender can take to address those rights, are essential 
for a lender to make an informed credit decision as to whether and when to 
advance funds based on the value of Trademarked Inventory. 
I. OVERVIEW: PROTECTED TRADEMARKS 
A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol or design, or a combination of 
words, phrases, symbols or designs, that a person or entity uses to identify 
and distinguish its goods from goods sold by others.2 For example, the “Polo” 
trademark, along with the image of a polo player riding on horseback, 
identifies apparel made by Ralph Lauren, and distinguishes such apparel 
from that produced by other manufacturers. Under some circumstances, 
trademark protection can extend beyond words, phrases or symbols to 
include a product’s packaging or a unique, identifying color. The unique 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 This paper assumes that the party with whom the borrower has contracted is the owner of the 
trademark. The analysis would be similar if such party is itself a licensee of the trademark from the 
trademark owner, and the borrower is a sub-licensee. 
2 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
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shape of a Coca-Cola bottle or the particular blue color of a Tiffany’s box 
may serve as identifying features. 
Trademarks indicate to consumers the source of a particular good. 
Trademarks also provide consumers with an impression of the quality of the 
good associated with the mark. Rights under trademarks can arise under 
common law or state or federal statute. State common law originally 
provided the main source of protection for trademarks. Protection under state 
and common law still exists, but protection under those laws may be limited 
to the locale in which the trademark is used. The Lanham Act3 is the 
applicable federal law that provides the mechanism for registering 
trademarks and bestowing rights on the holder of a federally registered 
trademark. 
A. Types of Trademarks 
To qualify as a trademark, a mark must be distinctive so as to identify 
the source of a particular good. Trademarks are commonly grouped into four 
categories based on the relationship between the mark and the underlying 
product: (i) arbitrary or fanciful, (ii) suggestive, (iii) descriptive, or 
(iv) generic.4 A mark is afforded the greatest protection if it is arbitrary or 
fanciful. The level of protection decreases with each successive category, 
with generic marks not afforded any protection. 
Fanciful marks are marks that are invented for use on a product. 
Examples include “Lexus” for automobiles and “Exxon” for gasoline. 
Arbitrary marks are marks that exist in vocabulary, but bear no relation to the 
product on which they are affixed. “Jaguar” automobiles and “Shell” 
gasoline constitute arbitrary marks. 
Suggestive trademarks suggest, rather than describe, the qualities of the 
underlying product. At the same time, however, the mark is not totally 
unrelated to such product. In other words, “the exercise of some imagination 
is required to associate a suggestive mark with the product.”5 Examples of 
suggestive marks are “Liquid Paper” for correction fluid and “Roach Motel” 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 15 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (2006). 
4 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
5 George & Co. LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 394 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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for insect traps. Like arbitrary or fanciful marks, suggestive marks are 
inherently distinctive and are given a high degree of protection. 
Descriptive marks directly describe a particular characteristic of the 
product in a way that does not require any exercise of the imagination.6 They 
are not inherently distinctive, but instead require a showing of secondary 
meaning in order to be afforded trademark protection. “Saying that a 
trademark has acquired secondary meaning is shorthand for saying that a 
descriptive mark has become sufficiently distinctive to establish a mental 
association in buyers’ minds between the alleged mark and a single source of 
the product.”7 “After Tan” post-tanning lotion and “Holiday Inn” hotels 
constitute descriptive marks. 
Finally, a generic mark describes a product in its entirety, and “neither 
signifies the source of goods nor distinguishes the particular product from 
other products on the market.”8 Unlike distinctive marks, a generic mark is 
never entitled to trademark protection. For example, the term “oil” is a 
generic term. Thus, a petroleum company cannot claim an exclusive right to 
use the term “oil” with respect to its product. Sometimes, however, the 
distinction between descriptive and generic terms is not entirely clear. For 
example, the marks “All News Channel” and “Discount Mufflers” have been 
adjudged to be generic and not entitled to any protection, despite assertions 
that the marks acquired a secondary meaning.9 
B. Abandonment 
A trademark owner loses its right to enforce its trademark if the mark is 
deemed abandoned. Abandonment can be unintentional, and occurs when the 
owner causes or permits the mark to lose its significance as an indicator of 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publishing, 364 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2004). 
7 George & Co., 575 F.3d at 394 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To determine 
whether a given term has acquired secondary meaning, courts often look to: (i) the amount and manner of 
advertising; (ii) the volume of sales; (iii) the length and manner of the term’s use; and (iv) results of 
consumer surveys. Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 1983). 
8 Retail Servs., 364 F.3d at 538. 
9 In re Conus Communications Co., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1717 (TTAB 1992) (“All News Channel” found 
to be generic for television broadcasting and production services.); Discount Muffler Shop, Inc. v. 
MEINEKE Realty Corporation, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (“Discount Muffler” found to 
be generic for muffler shops.). 
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the origin of goods or services.10 This can occur due to a failure to defend the 
mark or by “naked” licensing of the mark. 
A failure to pursue infringers can result in two adverse outcomes. First, 
if the use of the trademark becomes widespread, then the term could be 
deemed to be generic and not subject to protection. The terms “linoleum,” 
“aspirin” and “thermos” were once trademarked terms that have since been 
declared generic due to widespread usage. Second, if a trademark owner does 
not take action against an infringing use, then the owner could be deemed to 
have abandoned the trademark and the “infringing” party may be able to 
obtain legal rights to it.11 
Naked licensing involves the licensing of a mark without exercising 
“reasonable control over the nature and quality of the goods, services, or 
business on which the [mark] is used by the licensee.”12 A naked license may 
be deemed to exist if the license does not contain any quality standards and 
the licensor does not take any affirmative action to ensure that quality is 
maintained to such standards.13 The mark is deemed to lose protection 
because a trademark is a representation to the public of the quality of the 
product or service associated with the mark, and the lack of quality controls 
indicates that there is no consistent standard of quality. 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 Abandonment can also be intentional, namely, when the trademark owner ceases actual use of 
the mark for three or more years, with no intention of using the trademark again in the future. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (2006). 
11 See, e.g., Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 304 F.3d 1167, 1173 (11th Cir. 
2002) (holding that “a defendant who successfully shows that a trademark plaintiff has abandoned a mark 
is free to use the mark without liability to the plaintiff”); California Cedar Prods. v. Pine Mountain Corp., 
724 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The first party to use an abandoned trademark in a commercially 
meaningful way after its abandonment, is entitled to exclusive ownership and use of that trademark.”). 
12 Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., Inc., 639 F.3d 788, 789 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 33 (1995)). 
13 Id.; Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 597 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that licensor of “Da Vinci” mark in connection with wine could not prevent use of “Leonardo 
Da Vinci” mark by a competitor where the license agreement did not contain any quality control standards 
and the licensor did not have “any involvement whatsoever regarding the quality of the wine and 
maintaining it at any level”). 
2018] FINANCING TRADEMARKED INVENTORY 175 
 
Vol. 36, No. 2 (2018) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2018.145 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
II. BORROWERS THAT MANUFACTURE TRADEMARKED INVENTORY 
A. License Agreement Due Diligence 
If a borrower manufactures inventory under a trademark license from a 
third party, its ability to manufacture and sell Trademarked Inventory likely 
will be governed by the terms of the license agreement with the licensor. So 
long as the license agreement remains in effect and the borrower is in 
compliance with the terms thereof, then the licensor will be precluded from 
bringing a trademark infringement action against the borrower. If, however, 
the license agreement expires or is terminated, the borrower will lose its 
ability to use the trademark unless the agreement provides for a period of use 
after such expiration or termination or the sale of Trademarked Inventory is 
otherwise permitted by applicable law. 
A lender that is asked to extend financing against Trademarked 
Inventory should review the license agreement to determine its material 
terms and understand the borrower’s rights and obligations under the license. 
Items to look for include the following: 
● Licensor: Is the party named as licensor the owner of the trademark 
(based on a search at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office or other due diligence)? 
● Strength of Mark: Is the trademark arbitrary or fanciful or has it 
acquired a secondary meaning? 
● Term: How long will the license last? Does the period correspond 
to the term of the proposed credit facility to be extended to the 
borrower? 
● Territory: Is the borrower’s right to sell Trademarked Inventory 
limited by geographic area (e.g., the United States or a specific part 
thereof)? Has the borrower complied with this limitation? 
● Products: What products can the borrower manufacture under the 
terms of the license that incorporate the licensed trademark and 
how is the trademark affixed? Is it possible to remove the licensed 
trademark from the product without incurring significant cost or 
damage to the product? 
● Quality Controls: What steps will the licensor take to ensure that 
the Trademarked Inventory is of a quality consistent with that 
required by the licensor? Have there been any quality control issues 
during the life of the license agreement? 
176 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 36:169 
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● Royalties: How are royalties calculated and when are they paid? Is 
there a minimum royalty requirement? If so, has the borrower 
exceeded the minimum for each measurement period during the 
license agreement? 
● Financial Covenants: Must the borrower satisfy any financial 
covenants? If so, has it done so in the past and do its projections 
indicate that it will satisfy them over the life of the proposed credit 
facility? 
● Assignability: Can the license be assigned by the borrower to a 
third party? 
● Termination: What events will trigger the licensor’s right to 
terminate the license (e.g., failure to pay royalties; failure to 
maintain quality controls)? Are there any events that would result 
in immediate termination (e.g., a bankruptcy is filed by or against 
the borrower)? 
● Cure Rights: Can the borrower cure certain defaults that might 
otherwise enable the licensor to terminate the license (e.g., 
payment of minimum royalties)? 
● Post-Termination Rights: Does the license agreement allow the 
borrower to sell Trademarked Inventory after expiration or 
termination? Does the licensor have the right (or obligation) to 
repurchase Trademarked Inventory and, if so, how is the purchase 
price calculated? 
The answers to these questions will help determine whether it may be 
appropriate for the lender to extend financing based on Trademarked 
Inventory and, if so, the parameters to calculate advance rates14 associated 
with such inventory. For example, if the borrower has exhibited quality 
control issues, a lender may not elect to lend against Trademarked Inventory. 
As discussed in greater detail below, a sale of Trademarked Inventory that is 
of insufficient quality can constitute trademark infringement. In addition, the 
advance rates used with respect to such inventory should take into account 
the licensor’s right to repurchase inventory (and the purchase price paid), the 
sell-off period that would otherwise apply, any royalties that may be due to 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 An advance rate is the percentage that the lender applies to the value of the inventory to determine 
the amount of the asset-based loan. Advance rates typically are determined based upon the dollar amount 
that inventory can yield in an orderly sale of such inventory within a specified period of time, usually 
within 60–90 days. 
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the licensor, and, if the licensed trademark can be removed from the 
Trademarked Inventory, the value of the goods absent the trademark. 
An appraiser that is calculating the orderly liquidation value of 
Trademarked Inventory should also be cognizant of the time period during 
which the borrower would be able to dispose of the inventory. The liquidation 
period used by the appraiser should not be longer than the sell-off period 
provided in the license agreement, and the valuation should be based on such 
sell-off period. However, such valuation may be adjusted if the licensed 
trademark can be removed from the Trademarked Inventory without 
undermining the integrity of the inventory, thereby allowing it to be sold in 
its altered state without such restrictions beyond the contractual sell-off 
period. 
B. Post-Default Foreclosure Against License Agreement 
If the lender’s loans are secured by a blanket security interest in the 
borrower’s assets, that security interest would include, as a general 
intangible, all rights that the borrower has under its license agreement. 
However, there may be occasions where the license agreement restricts 
assignments or encumbrances without the licensor’s consent. Such 
restrictions raise questions regarding: (i) the effectiveness of the security 
interest granted in favor of the lender, and (ii) the lender’s ability to foreclose 
upon its security interest in the license agreement and continue performance 
under the license agreement. 
The “anti-assignment” provision contained in Section 9-408(a) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) renders ineffective any contractual 
language limiting the borrower from granting a security interest in the license 
agreement. That section provides: 
[A] term in . . . an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which 
relates to a . . . general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or 
franchise, and which term prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the . . . 
account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or creation, attachment, or 
perfection of a security interest in, the . . . general intangible, is ineffective to the 
extent that the term: 
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security 
interest; or 
(2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, or 
perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of 
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recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under 
the . . . general intangible.15 
The provision’s purpose is to give value to the otherwise unassignable 
rights under license agreements so that debtors can obtain more credit.16 
Notwithstanding this objective, Section 9-408(d) severely limits the lender’s 
rights with respect to the license and Trademarked Inventory produced 
pursuant to the license. That section provides: 
To the extent that a term in . . . an agreement between an account debtor and a 
debtor which relates to a . . . general intangible or a rule of law, statute, or 
regulation described in subsection (c) would be effective under law other than this 
article but is ineffective under subsection (a) or (c), the creation, attachment, or 
perfection of a security interest in the . . . general intangible: 
(1) is not enforceable against the . . . account debtor; 
(2) does not impose a duty or obligation on . . . the account debtor; 
(3) does not require the . . . account debtor to recognize the security interest, 
pay or render performance to the secured party, or accept payment or performance 
from the secured party; 
(4) does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor’s rights 
under the . . . general intangible, including any related information or materials 
furnished to the debtor in the transaction giving rise to the . . . general intangible; 
(5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have access 
to any trade secrets or confidential information of the . . . account debtor; and 
(6) does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest in 
the . . . general intangible.17 
Based on Section 9-408(d), the secured party cannot “use or assign the 
debtor’s rights” under the license for the purpose of manufacturing or selling 
Trademarked Inventory. While seemingly inconsistent with Section 9-
408(a), this limitation preserves the licensor’s ability to control which entities 
may use its intellectual property. As such, the licensor is not required to 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 U.C.C. § 9-408(a) (2012) (emphasis added). U.C.C. Section 9-102(a)(3) defines an account 
debtor as a person obligated on an account, chattel paper or general intangible. Therefore, the term 
“account debtor” as used in Section 9-408 can refer to the licensor or the borrower (as licensee), depending 
on the context. 
16 Stephen O. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual Property under Revised UCC Article 9, CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1077, 1093 (1999). 
17 U.C.C. § 9-408(d) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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recognize the grant of a security interest by its licensee to its lender, and can 
prohibit the lender from foreclosing upon its security interest in the license 
and the rights running in favor of the borrower in such license.18 The effect 
of these restrictions is that the lender cannot rely upon its grant of a security 
interest in the license as a means to liquidate Trademarked Inventory, but 
instead must look to some other legal basis that permits its sale. 
C. Post-Termination Sale of Trademarked Inventory 
1. Licensor Agreement between Lender and Licensor 
In light of the restrictions contained in Section 9-408(d), the lender’s 
best solution is to seek an agreement directly with the licensor regarding the 
lender’s rights with respect to Trademarked Inventory. By doing so, the 
lender can address any deficiencies that may exist in the license agreement 
and afford the lender sufficient time to realize upon its collateral. Common 
components of a licensor agreement include: 
● Acknowledgment and Consent: The licensor’s acknowledgement 
and consent to the borrower’s grant of a security interest to the 
lender in the borrower’s rights under the license agreement and the 
Trademarked Inventory. 
● Non-Exclusive License: The licensor’s grant to the lender of a non-
exclusive license to use the licensed trademark in conjunction with 
the lender’s marketing and sale of any Trademarked Inventory. The 
license can include both the right to sell finished goods and, if 
appropriate, convert raw materials and work in process into 
finished goods. 
● Term: The parties’ agreement regarding the period of time during 
which the lender can exercise the non-exclusive license, which 
ideally should be at least the projected liquidation period as 
indicated by the underlying appraisal. If possible, the lender should 
seek to have such period tolled in the event of the borrower’s 
bankruptcy. 
● Territory: The parties’ agreement with respect to the territory in 
which the Trademarked Inventory may be sold. 
                                                                                                                           
 
18 Weise, supra note 16, at 1094–95. 
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● Royalties: The lender’s agreement to pay royalties at the same rate 
as provided in the license agreement. If the agreement contains a 
minimum royalty requirement, the lender might also seek to 
exclude it from any responsibility to pay such amount. 
● Notice and Cure Right: The lender should seek the licensor’s 
agreement to provide notice to the lender of any default by the 
borrower under, or termination by the licensor of, the license 
agreement. If the default is curable (e.g., failure to pay royalties by 
the applicable due date), the lender may also seek to add a cure 
period during which it has the right to cure such default. 
● Repurchase Right: If the license agreement contains a repurchase 
option, the lender may wish to restate the manner in which the 
purchase price is calculated. If the license agreement does not 
contain an option, it may be advantageous for the lender to add such 
a provision to assist in liquidation. In any event, the lender should 
also require that any amount paid by the licensor to purchase 
Trademarked Inventory should be at a price that is in excess of the 
advance rate applicable to the loan extended by the lender to the 
borrower, that all amounts should be paid directly to the lender, and 
that all payments should be made without offset against any 
liabilities that may by owing by the borrower to the licensor (e.g., 
for past due royalties or other charges). 
2. Lender’s Rights Absent a Licensor Agreement 
A licensor agreement is the preferred approach to ensure the lender can 
realize upon its collateral, either pursuant to an orderly liquidation or 
foreclosure sale. However, it may not always be feasible to obtain such an 
agreement. A licensor may be unwilling to enter into such an agreement, or 
even if it is willing, the delays, costs, and potential limitations imposed by 
the licensor may make reaching an agreement prohibitive. In such instances, 
a lender may rely on the rights granted to the borrower in the license 
agreement in an orderly liquidation. Once the license agreement has 
terminated and any sell-off period has expired, the lender would need to fall 
back on whatever rights may be afforded under applicable law regarding the 
sale of goods bearing licensed trademarks. The greatest immediate threat to 
the asset-based lender is the risk that the licensor obtains an injunction that 
prohibits future sales of the Trademarked Inventory. To protect against this 
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risk, a lender should include in its loan agreement with the borrower a 
covenant that the borrower notify the lender of any default under the license 
agreement or receipt of notice from the trademark owner of its intention to 
terminate the license agreement. 
The licensor’s ability to obtain injunctive relieve will hinge upon the 
application of the Lanham Act in the particular case. Notably, the Lanham 
Act does not grant the trademark owner an absolute right to prevent the sale 
of Trademarked Inventory. Decisional case law construing the Lanham Act 
limits a trademark owner’s right to control the sale of licensed products after 
a “first sale” of “genuine goods” has occurred.19 These limitations are 
addressed below. 
a. First Sale 
The “first sale” doctrine provides that the trademark owner’s right to 
control the distribution of a product bearing its trademark does not extend 
beyond the first sale of its product.20 The doctrine protects the trademark 
owner by preventing others from confusing consumers about the origin or 
make of a product, which confusion ordinarily does not occur when a 
“genuine article” bearing a true mark is sold.21 However, the doctrine also 
seeks to preserve competition by limiting the producer’s power to control a 
product’s resale after the initial sale. In other words, the first-sale doctrine 
provides that “a purchaser who does no more than stock, display, and resell 
a producer’s product under the producer’s trademark violates no right 
conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act.”22 
When a lender seeks to realize on its collateral, the primary question to 
resolve is whether a first sale has occurred. If so, the licensor may be 
precluded from bringing an infringement action. Unfortunately, there does 
not appear to be any case law addressing whether a lender’s liquidation of 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 369, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Case law lacks 
uniformity as to whether both requirements are necessary for a sale to be free of trademark infringement, 
although the better reasoned analysis concludes that both criteria must be satisfied to avoid liability under 
the Lanham Act. 
20 Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 914 (1995). 
21 Bel Canto Design, Ltd. v. MSS HiFi, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 208, 222–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
22 Sebastian, 53 F.3d at 1076. 
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collateral runs afoul of the first sale doctrine. Most case law and commentary 
suggests that sales by a licensee made after expiration of a license agreement 
(and any subsequent sell-off period provided in the license) constitute 
infringement by the licensee, although this conclusion is not universal. The 
case law discussed below highlight the inconsistent application of the first 
sale doctrine. 
Bill Blass, Ltd. v. SAZ Corp.23 involved a dispute between a licensor 
(Bill Blass) and a licensee that were parties to two separate license 
agreements, the first of which related to the manufacture and sale of women’s 
coats and the second of which related to the manufacture and sale of men’s 
coats. Both licenses had a fixed term which had expired. The license relating 
to women’s coats provided a three-month sell-off period for previously 
manufactured inventory following expiration of the license. The license 
relating to the men’s coats was silent as to the sell-off period. The licensee 
sold its assets to the defendant after both licenses and the sell-off period for 
women’s coats had expired. The asset purchase agreement also provided that 
the defendant assume all of the licensee’s rights and obligations under the 
license agreements. Bill Blass learned of the continued sale of the licensed 
inventory despite expiration of the licenses, and sued to enjoin future sales 
on the basis of trademark infringement. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the defendant’s 
sale of trademarked inventory after termination of the license agreements 
constituted trademark infringement. Due to the expiration of the sell-off 
period for women’s coats, the court concluded that the sales of such coats 
constituted infringement. More importantly, the court also rejected the 
defendant’s argument that it had an indefinite period to liquidate the men’s 
coats because the license relating to those coats, unlike the license for the 
women’s coats, was silent as to the sell-off period. The court found that the 
“far more reasonable construction” was that the licensee under the men’s coat 
license “undertook the risk that if it kept its inventory at too high a level the 
inventory might not be sold by the expiration date of the license.”24 The court 
also rejected the defendant’s alternative argument that it was a “bona fide 
first purchaser” of the inventory from the licensee and, under the first sale 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 751 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1984). 
24 Id. at 155. 
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doctrine, was authorized to resell the garments without removing the Bill 
Blass label. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York in Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Company.25 That 
case involved former major league pitcher Nolan Ryan, who had licensed to 
the defendant the right to manufacture, sell and sublicense numerous 
products bearing Ryan’s likeness and/or signature. A dispute arose regarding 
minimum guaranteed payments due under the license agreements, in 
response to which Ryan terminated the agreements and, through his counsel, 
informed the defendant that it was no longer authorized to manufacture, sell, 
distribute or promote any products. 
The defendant asserted that the first sale doctrine precluded a finding of 
trademark infringement with respect to goods manufactured prior to 
termination of the license, because the goods were not altered and consumers 
received “exactly what they expected.” The court rejected the defendant’s 
assertion, instead holding that “[i]f the trademark owner did not approve the 
original sale, the goods cannot be considered genuine as a matter of law and 
infringement is established.”26 According to the district court: 
[I]f a licensee could sell inventory manufactured during the term of the license 
over an indefinite period after its termination or expiration, the expiration date 
would have little force or meaning. One can imagine a scenario where a licensee 
intentionally creates a large surplus and thereby grants to itself a de facto 
extension of the license. Although Plaintiff does not make such an allegation in 
the present case, Defendant does not have the right to liquidate its inventory and 
disregard Plaintiff’s objections, simply because the products were manufactured 
prior to termination.27 
Contrary to the conclusion reached in cases such as Bill Blass and Ryan, 
some courts have held that a first sale after termination of a trademark license 
is not actionable. In Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int’l (America) 
Corp.,28 Monte Carlo contracted with Daewoo for the manufacture of 2,400 
                                                                                                                           
 
25 107 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
26 Id. at 382, relying upon RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24 cmt. c (1995) 
(“[t]rademarked goods produced by a manufacturer under contract with the trademark owner are not 
genuine goods until their sale under the mark is authorized by the trademark owner. Thus, if the trademark 
owner rejects the goods, the manufacturer may not use the mark in reselling the goods to others.”). 
27 Id. at 385. See also FURminator, Inc. v. Kirk Weaver Enters., Inc., 545 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690 
(N.D. Ohio 2008) (“Goods are not genuine goods until their sale is authorized by the trademark owner.”). 
28 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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men’s dress shirts with the Monte Carlo label. Monte Carlo rejected the shirts 
because Daewoo delivered them too late for Christmas sales. Daewoo, 
through a subsidiary, sold the shirts to discount retailers without Monte 
Carlo’s permission. The court held that Daewoo’s unauthorized sale was a 
not a trademark violation under California state trademark law.29 The court 
noted that the goods were “genuine,” and that state and federal trademark law 
requires a “showing of buyer confusion as to the source, origin, or 
sponsorship of goods,” which was absent in this case. According to the court, 
“[t]he goods sold by Daewoo were not imitations of Monte Carlo shirts; they 
were the genuine product, planned and sponsored by Monte Carlo and 
produced for it on contract for future sale. . . . [T]he absence of Monte 
Carlo’s authorization of the discount retailers to sell does not alter this.”30 
Similarly, a California state appellate court in Unzipped Apparel, LLC 
v. Sweet Sportswear, LLC,31 relying in part on the Monte Carlo decision, held 
that infringement did not occur upon a first sale in an action involving the 
sale of jeans made by a non-licensee former manufacturer. The action 
involved a fallout between Iconix Brands, owner of the “Bongo” trademark, 
and Sweet Sportswear, which created a joint venture with Iconix named 
Unzipped Apparel. Iconix licensed the “Bongo” name to Unzipped, which 
was managed by Sweet. Sweet subcontracted production of the jeans to an 
affiliate, Azteca. When the deal soured, Iconix terminated the license, 
demanded that all sales of the Bongo-branded jeans stop, and began efforts 
to obtain all Bongo-branded jeans in Sweet’s possession, including those that 
were in the middle of the manufacturing and distribution process. Sweet 
ignored the demands and continued to sell all Bongo-branded jeans 
manufactured by Azteca to all accounts that purchased them, as well as any 
leftovers due to cancellations or other reasons. According to Sweet, these 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 The Ninth Circuit subsequently noted in an unpublished decision that because California 
trademark law is “substantially congruent” to the Lanham Act, Monte Carlo may provide guidance in 
cases arising under federal trademark law, although it is not binding. Grateful Palate Inc. v. Joshua Tree 
Imports, LLC, 220 Fed. Appx. 635, 637 (9th Cir. 2007). 
30 Monte Carlo, 707 F.2d at 1057–58. 
31 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5127 (Cal. App. July 7, 2010). As an unpublished decision, 
California rules do not permit the decision to be cited as authority, except when the opinion is relevant 
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. California Rules of Court Rule 
8.1115. 
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actions were taken to mitigate damages following what Sweet perceived to 
be a wrongful termination of the license. 
Sweet argued that the sale was permitted because the jeans were genuine 
goods manufactured according to the licensor’s specifications. Iconix, 
relying on Ryan and similar cases, countered that the genuine goods defense 
was not applicable where Iconix had not authorized the initial sale.32 The 
court failed to apply the first sale doctrine as a basis for prohibiting Sweet’s 
sales despite Iconix’s demands for the return of the goods. In reaching its 
decision, the court considered (and ultimate distinguished) case law and 
commentary supporting the view posited by the court in Ryan, holding: 
If the defendant manufacturer were required to prove authorization in order to 
invoke the genuine goods defense, then manufacturers could never resell rejected 
or leftover goods when the trademark holder terminates the contract, refuses to 
pay for the goods, or wrongfully claims that the goods are defective. . . . 
Defendants’ sale of the Bongo jeans in their possession after the August 5, 2004 
termination letter may have been a breach of contract, or it may have been a 
tort. . . . It may have been unprofessional and meanspirited. It was not, however, 
trademark infringement.33 
It is unclear whether the two lines of cases can be reconciled. One 
possible explanation is that a first sale will be deemed to occur when the 
licensor first authorizes a private-label manufacturer to affix the mark to the 
goods on behalf of the licensor, but later revokes its authorization.34 Whether 
or not these disparate interpretations can be harmonized, a lender should 
always take note of the licensor’s and borrower’s conduct surrounding the 
termination of the underlying license. By doing so, the lender can better 
analyze whether the facts might support the continued sale of Trademarked 
Inventory without the specter of trademark infringement. A court may view 
more favorably post-termination sales of Trademarked Inventory if the 
licensor’s termination was arbitrary or unauthorized as opposed to an 
expiration of the term per the express language of the license. 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 Unzipped Apparel, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5127 at *186–87. 
33 Id. at *190. See also McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1174 (1996) (licensee could sell knives bearing the licensor’s trademarks after 
termination of the license agreement when the licensor refused to pay for the knives; court held that 
licensee had an implied license to sell the remaining inventory because there was “no reason why the 
owner of intellectual property rights deserves to evade application of the ordinary contract remedy of 
resale for an unjustified refusal to pay”). 
34 Unzipped Apparel, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5127 at *176–77 (citing 4 CALLMANN, 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 22:18, at 222-312 (4th ed. 2004)). 
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b. Genuine Goods 
Even if a first sale has occurred, trademark infringement can also exist 
if the goods are not “genuine goods.” Issues regarding the genuineness of 
goods typically arise in either the context of quality control, or when goods 
have been repackaged or otherwise modified prior to resale. 
 (1) Quality Control 
One of the most important protections afforded by the Lanham Act is 
“the right to control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under the 
holder’s trademark.”35 Based on this general principal, case law widely 
supports the conclusion that goods bearing licensed trademarks may not be 
sold when the licensor has not had an opportunity to confirm whether the 
goods are of sufficient quality. 
For example, in El Greco Leather Products, El Greco contracted with 
Solemio to manufacture shoes with the “Candie’s” trademark. The contract 
required an inspection certificate issued by El Greco’s local agent before 
Solemio could receive payment. El Greco cancelled the last two orders 
because they were defective. Solemio then sold the shoes to the defendant. 
The Second Circuit found that the shoes were not genuine and held the 
defendant liable for trademark infringement. According to the court: 
[o]nce it cancelled the order, El Greco was entitled to assume that Solemio would 
not dispose of the shoes without either removing the CANDIE’S trademark (as in 
the custom and practice in the industry), or affording El Greco an opportunity to 
inspect the goods and certify their quality prior to disposal, or, at the minimum, 
seeking instructions from El Greco on how to dispose of them.36 
Other courts have similarly found trademark infringement to exist where 
the licensor’s quality control standards have not been met or the licensor did 
not have an opportunity to verify, even in instances involving a sale of the 
licensed goods in the licensee’s bankruptcy.37 
                                                                                                                           
 
35 El Greco Leather Products Co., Inc. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987). 
36 Id. at 396. 
37 See, e.g., Ford Motor Company v. Cook, 28 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (court enjoined 
bankruptcy auction of licensed automobile grilles due to existence of Ford’s quality control procedures 
that required actual inspection; the grilles sold pursuant to the auction had not been inspected). See also 
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Indeed, the courts in Monte Carlo and Unzipped Apparel concluded—
en route to their holdings that the goods could be sold by the defendants—
that sufficient quality control oversight existed such that the goods were 
“genuine.” In Monte Carlo, the licensor rejected the shipment solely because 
they were delivered late, not because they failed to meet the licensor’s 
standard of quality. In Unzipped Apparel, the court acknowledged that the 
plaintiff had not presented any evidence that it did not have the opportunity 
to exercise its quality control rights before the post-termination sale of the 
jeans, or that a quality control issue existed with any of the jeans.38 
 (2) Material Difference 
A variant of the “genuine goods” line of cases involves goods that have 
been repackaged or modified since the time of their first sale. Trademark 
infringement can exist if the modified goods are “materially different” than 
those sold by the trademark owner, such that they generate consumer 
confusion about the source and quality of the trademarked product. Case law 
suggests that materiality must be determined on a case-by-case basis.39 This 
fact-specific analysis has resulted in seemingly inconsistent case law 
concluding that goods can be materially different even without significant 
modification, and that significant modification may not result in trademark 
infringement when the modification is fully disclosed. 
The U.S. district court in Davidoff & CIE, SA v. PLD Int’l Corp.40 found 
infringement in resold goods where the packaging for Davidoff Cool Water 
fragrances had been modified. PLD purchased goods that were intended for 
sales overseas or in duty-free shops, and sold them to discount retailers for 
distribution in the United States. Prior to reselling the goods, PLD removed 
the batch codes from the bottom of the bottles by using an etching tool, which 
                                                                                                                           
 
Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 661 F. Supp. 2d 632, 642 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (infringement when cosmetics were 
sold that were expired or past shelf life); Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104 (4th 
Cir. 1991) (enjoining sale of oil where Shell’s quality control requirements were not observed); Adolph 
Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 131 (D. Colo. 1980) (enjoining sale of beer that 
was not stored consistent with Coor’s quality control specifications). 
38 Unzipped Apparel, 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5127 at *185. 
39 Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1992). 
40 263 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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left a small mark on each bottle.41 Davidoff sued for trademark infringement 
on the basis that the mark left from the removal of the batch code could create 
a likelihood of confusion for the consumer, who might think the product had 
been the subject of tampering. The court found infringement to exist, holding 
that the removal of the batch code constituted a material difference not 
protected by the first sale doctrine. Agreeing with the district court, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that consumers could conclude 
that the etchings denoted tampering, and further concluded that tampering 
with the packaging (and not the product itself) was immaterial to its 
conclusion.42 
In contrast, there may be occasions where significant changes to the 
product do not result in trademark infringement, so long as the seller has 
disclosed the changes made to the product. For example, in Champion Spark 
Plugs v. Sanders,43 the defendant collected used Champion spark plugs, 
repaired and reconditioned them, and resold them as “renewed” Champion 
spark plugs. The Champion spark plug trademark remained on the plugs and 
boxes, and the defendant’s name and address did not appear on the boxes. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant’s acts did not give rise to 
trademark infringement. The court noted that the case dealt with second hand 
goods which may have inferior qualities, and so long as the trademark owner 
is not identified with the inferior qualities and the reseller is disclosing that 
the goods have been reconditioned, “full disclosure gives the manufacturer 
all the protection to which he is entitled.”44 
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in favor 
of a company that “reconditioned” golf balls in Nitro Leisure Products, 
L.L.C. v. Acushnet Company.45 There, the defendant took marred golf balls 
                                                                                                                           
 
41 According to the court, the mark was approximately 1⅛ inches long by ⅛ inch wide. 
42 Id. at 1303. Compare Graham Webb Int’l Ltd. P’ship v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 
909, 916 (E.D. Ark. 1995) (removal of batch codes from hair care products did not constitute 
infringement), with John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Pete-N-Larry’s Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1020, 1027 (W.D.N.Y. 
1994) (removal of batch codes from bottles constituted a material difference where removal left noticeable 
marks on the bottles and erased certain printed information). 
43 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947). 
44 Id. at 130. See also Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 367–68 (1924) (trademark 
infringement did not exist where defendant purchased plaintiff’s toilet powders, subjected them to 
pressure and added a binder, and sold in a metal case; defendant disavowed on its packaging any affiliation 
with plaintiff and identified to the consumer that defendant had compounded and packaged the product 
independent from plaintiff). 
45 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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and reconditioned the balls by (i) removing the base coat of paint, the clear 
coat layer, and the trademark and model marks, (ii) repainting the balls, and 
(iii) reaffixing the original manufacturer’s trademark. The defendant further 
labeled each golf ball as “refurbished” with a disclosure of the steps that may 
have been taken to recondition the balls, as well as that the balls had not been 
endorsed or approved by the original manufacturer or protected under the 
original manufacturer’s warranty. The plaintiff, maker of Titleist golf balls, 
asserted that the described process caused the end product to bear no 
resemblance to the original product in terms of performance, quality or 
appearance. Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Champion, the 
Nitro court held that “so long as the customer is getting a product with the 
expected characteristics, and so long as the goodwill built up by the 
trademark owner is not eroded by being identified with inferior quality, the 
Lanham Act does not prevent the truthful use of trademarks, even if such use 
results in the enrichment of others.”46 The court concluded that consumers 
would not expect the reconditioned balls to perform as well as new golf balls, 
reaffirming the district court’s conclusion that the repairs to the golf balls 
were not so extensive so that they could not be labeled with the Titleist mark. 
Notwithstanding Champion and similar cases, some courts have held 
that seemingly “full” disclosure can be inadequate to avoid a likelihood of 
confusion. In Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distribution, LLC,47 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found trademark infringement 
to exist where the defendant sold on eBay radar detectors bearing the 
plaintiff’s trademarks. Similar to Davidoff, the serial numbers had been 
removed from the radar detectors to avoid identifying the distributors that 
had sold the products to the defendant in violation of the distributor’s 
distribution agreement with the plaintiff. The removal of the serial numbers 
caused the radar detectors to be ineligible for software upgrades, rebates, 
service assistance, warranties, and recalls. Unlike Davidoff, however, the 
defendant disclosed on eBay that the products did not bear a serial number, 
that the manufacturer would not honor the warranty if purchased off eBay, 
and that the defendant provided the purchaser its own one-year warranty. 
Notwithstanding these disclosures, the court held that the substitute warranty 
                                                                                                                           
 
46 Id. at 1362. 
47 562 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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and the manner in which the defendant disclosed the warranty to the 
consumer were not sufficient to overcome potential confusion and infringed 
on the trademark owner’s goodwill.48 
A similar result was reached in a case involving sales by Staples, Inc. of 
Montblanc pens on which the serial number and other markings had been 
removed.49 Unlike Beltronics, however, Staples made extensive disclosures 
regarding the source of the pens. First, Staples included a disclosure at the 
display case in which the pens were housed informing consumers that it was 
not an authorized reseller of Montblanc products. Second, Staples placed a 
sticker on the bottom of each pen box that described the serial numbers and 
other marks that were removed from the pen, explained the manufacturer’s 
service guide and warranty were not included in the package, and notified 
customers that Montblanc may not honor its warranty if the pens were 
purchased from Staples.50 Notwithstanding Staples’ extensive disclosures, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts declined to follow 
Champion, instead finding that the disclosures did not address the problem 
of post-sale confusion by non-purchasers, such as gift recipients. Notably, 
nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in Champion suggests that the need 
for full disclosure extends to users beyond the initial purchaser. The absence 
of any such discussion may indicate that the Montblanc decision went too 
far. Every product can be resold or transferred after its initial purchase and, 
in each such case, the risk of non-disclosure exists as to each subsequent 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 Id. at 1075–76. 
49 Montblanc-Simplo Gmbh v. Staples, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Mass. 2001). 
50 The full disclosure on the box stated: “This package contains one authentic and genuine 
Montblanc® pen or pencil in the original Montblanc® box, which this store sells at a significant discount 
to the manufacturer’s suggested retail price. The package does not include the manufacturer’s service 
guide and warranty, which was placed by the manufacturer in this original Montblanc® box. In addition, 
a PIX® trademark originally stamped on the inside of the clip, on the central band in the middle of the 
pen and/or on the Montblanc® refill has been removed. The serial number assigned to the Montblanc® 
pen by the manufacturer has also been removed. Because the importer, The Alpha Group is not an 
authorized Montblanc® dealer and because the manufacturer’s service guide and warranty are not 
included in this package, the manufacturer may not honor its warranty from customers who purchased 
Montblanc® pens or pencils from this store. This store, however, guarantees everything it sells, including 
Montblanc® pens & pencils. If you purchase a Montblanc® pen or pencil from us and it malfunctions, 
simply return it to the store within 30 days in the original box with your sales receipt for a replacement or 
full refund. Montblanc® is a registered U.S. trademark of Montblanc-Simplo GmbH. PIX® is a registered 
U.S. trademark of Montblanc, Inc. The Alpha Group and this store are not affiliated with either 
Montblanc-Simplo GmbH or Montblanc, Inc.” Id. at 241–42. 
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recipient. If Montblanc were more broadly adopted, it seemingly could 
swallow the rule created in Champion.51 
3. Liability for Infringement and Risks to Lender 
a. Injunctive and Monetary Relief 
If the borrower’s sale of Trademarked Inventory is not permitted under 
the license agreement or due to the application of the first sale doctrine, then 
the licensor would be entitled to both injunctive and monetary relief. 
Monetary relief may include: (i) the borrower’s profits attributable to 
unauthorized sales of Trademarked Inventory, (ii) damages sustained by the 
licensor as a result of such sales, and (iii) the costs of the action. Damages 
can also be trebled in cases where the licensor has demonstrated the 
borrower’s bad faith.52 
Each of these remedies can have a significant adverse effect on the 
borrower and its lender. As for the borrower, injunctive relief could impede 
the borrower’s ability to conduct business going forward if the manufacture 
and sale of Trademarked Inventory represents a significant part of its 
business. Monetary damages could also place a financial obligation on the 
borrower that it is unable to satisfy. 
As for the lender, injunctive relief may limit the lender’s ability to 
realize on the collateral supporting its loans to the borrower. In the most 
extreme case, Trademarked Inventory may incorporate a trademark that 
cannot be removed without rendering the inventory unsalable. If 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 Courts also employ the material difference test where the goods are “gray market” goods—goods 
legally produced for a market outside the United States that are imported and sold in the United States. 
The goods are found to be “genuine” (and can be resold in the U.S.) if the goods are not materially different 
from their U.S. equivalent. See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 
633 (1st Cir. 1992) (owner of Perugina trademark entitled to injunctive relief where gray market 
chocolates differed from U.S. chocolates due to higher percentage of milk fat, different packaging, and 
less-stringent climate-controlled storage); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 
816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987) (owner of Cabbage Patch trademark entitled to injunctive relief where re-
imported dolls intended for Spanish market differed from U.S. market dolls due to Spanish language 
packaging, birth certificate, and adoption papers); Zip Int’l Group, LLC v. Trilini Imps., Inc., 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 55270 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2011) (granting summary judgment in favor of gray market 
importer of sunflower seeds; the importation of packaged sunflower seeds intended for non-U.S. markets 
did not constitute trademark infringement where the product and packaging were identical, 
notwithstanding the adverse competitive impact suffered by the licensor’s authorized U.S. distributor). 
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(a) and 1117(a) (2006). 
192 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 36:169 
 
Vol. 36, No. 2 (2018) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2018.145 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Trademarked Inventory cannot be sold, then the portion of the advances 
made against the value of such inventory could effectively become an 
unsecured obligation. In certain cases, it may be possible to remove the 
licensed trademark. However, the inventory may carry a lesser value in its 
altered state, and the lender could be undercollateralized if it advanced funds 
based on the value of the inventory with the licensed trademark. The lender 
may be able to protect itself by setting an advance rate based on an appraisal 
that values the inventory with the licensed trademarked removed from the 
inventory. 
b. Contributory Infringement 
It is also conceivable that a lender could face a claim for direct liability 
to the trademark owner as a contributory infringer. The U.S. Supreme Court 
in Inwood Laboratories Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. set forth the following 
two-part test for finding contributory liability in the context of trademark 
infringement: (i) the manufacturer or distributor of the infringing product 
intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or (ii) the manufacturer 
or distributor continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.53 Since Inwood, 
courts have expanded the concept of contributory infringement beyond 
manufacturers and distributors. A court now may examine the extent of 
control the defendant has over the infringing activity or the service provided 
by the defendant that enables the infringer to engage in the infringing 
activity.54 
The expanded contributory infringement standard has been applied to 
find directly liable entities that have provided services that facilitate the sale 
of infringing goods, including internet web hosting services, lessors and 
licensors of real property, and entities assisting in shipping functions.55 A 
                                                                                                                           
 
53 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
54 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“Direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark 
permits the expansion of Inwood Lab.’s ‘supplies a product’ requirement for contributory infringement.”). 
See also Craig M. Tighe, Protections for Lenders to Companies Using Licensed Trademarks, 5 
COMMERCIAL LENDING REV. 53, 59 (1990). 
55 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 
2011) (finding infringement by web-hosting service after its receipt of repeated notices from trademark 
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lender’s services appear to be of a different character as compared to third 
parties that provide services that facilitate the sale of infringing goods. 
Nonetheless, it is plausible that a trademark owner could assert that a lender 
that has encouraged the borrower to sell Trademarked Inventory after 
termination of the underlying license as a way to pay down its outstanding 
obligations has exercised sufficient control over the borrower’s infringing 
activity to warrant direct liability as a contributory infringer, resulting in joint 
and several liability with the borrower to the trademark owner.56 
c. Constructive Trust in Proceeds of Accounts 
A North Carolina state appellate court decision raises the novel 
proposition that a borrower’s trademark infringement could undermine a 
secured lender’s lien in accounts generated by the sale of infringing goods.57 
The case involved the sale by Prime Apparel to its customer, Variety, of 
certain goods bearing the “Newport Bay” trademark. After the goods were 
sold, Quick Response demanded that Variety cease making any payments to 
Prime Apparel on the basis that Quick Response, and not Prime Apparel, 
owned the disputed trademark. Variety, unsure of the rightful payee, brought 
an interpleader action in North Carolina state trial court and asked the court 
to determine to whom payment should be made. Prime Apparel’s factor, CIT, 
which had purchased the underlying receivables owing by Variety and made 
advances against the receivables, claimed it had a superior interest in the 
payments because it possessed a valid and perfected security interest in such 
receivables and the proceeds thereof. 
At the trial court level, Prime Apparel had failed to respond to various 
pleadings, resulting in entry of a default judgment against it for trademark 
                                                                                                                           
 
owner of the sale of infringing goods on sites hosted by the defendant; defendant had direct control over 
the “master switch” that kept the websites online but chose not to act); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. 
v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that flea market owner that was 
“willfully blind” to the sale of infringing goods by vendors on its premises could give rise to trademark 
infringement); Cartier Int’l B.V. v. Liu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003) (holding 
persons that arranged for the shipment of counterfeit goods on behalf of counterfeiters liable based on 
contributory infringement due to, among other evidence, existence of steady stream of merchandise and 
payment of shipping charges in cash and C.O.D.). 
56 Tighe, supra note 54, at 59. 
57 Variety Wholesalers, Inc. v. Prime Apparel, LLC, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 2495 (N.C. App. 
Dec. 6, 2011) (unpublished). 
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infringement. The trial court further held that Quick Response was entitled 
to the proceeds of the infringing sales as damages and that CIT had no 
interest in such proceeds. On appeal, a North Carolina court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision. 
With little legal analysis or citation to case law, the appellate court held 
that Prime Apparel had no right to the goods bearing the Newport Bay 
trademark or the proceeds from the sale of the goods due to Prime Apparel’s 
infringement of the trademark. According to the court, Prime Apparel had 
“no accounts receivable it could pass on to CIT through their prior agreement. 
Thus, CIT had no security interest in the interpleader funds and [CIT’s] 
argument must fail.”58 
Commentators have since labeled the decision as “draconian,” 
“unorthodox” and “simply wrong.”59 As of the date of this paper, the decision 
has not been referenced by any other court. The general consensus appears 
to be that the court viewed the proceeds from the sale of the inventory bearing 
the infringing mark as subject to a constructive trust for the benefit of the 
trademark owner. As one commentator noted in response to the decision: 
federal and state law does provide courts with substantial latitude in crafting 
remedies for trademark infringement violations, some of which may impact an 
infringing seller’s secured lender. Courts have broad powers to issue injunctions 
against future infringing sales, to freeze assets during the pendency of a trial 
and/or to require the infringing party to take certain actions such as accounting for 
the profits realized.60 
Nonetheless, most decisions give the trademark holder an unsecured 
claim for damages, which, contrary to the court’s decision, would not be 
superior to the interests of a secured creditor.61 
Whether the decision is wrong or merely an overzealous effort to craft 
a remedy in light of the default judgment entered by the trial court, it 
                                                                                                                           
 
58 Id. at *6–7. 
59 Robert B. Stein & Korey Grushka, Secured Lender Loses to IP Owner in Dispute over Proceeds 
of Trademarked Inventory, ABFJOURNAL (May/June 2012), http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/secured-
lender-loses-to-ip-owner-in-dispute-over-proceeds-of-trademarked-inventory/; Stephen L. Sepinuck & 
Kristen Adams, ABA BUSINESS LAW SECTION COMMERCIAL LAW NEWSLETTER, at 13 (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL190000pub/newsletter/201203/201203_commercial_
law_newsletter.pdf; Richard L. Mack & Nichelle N. Levy, Lenders, Don’t Get Caught With Your Pants 
Down: The Case for Trademark Due Diligence, Robinson Bradshaw Alerts (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://www.rbh.com/lenders-dont-get-caught-04-04-2012. 
60 Stein & Grushka, supra note 59. 
61 Sepinuck & Adams, supra note 59. 
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represents a possible outcome in at least one jurisdiction. The risk of such an 
interpretation reinforces the need for a lender to conduct adequate due 
diligence before advancing funds based on Trademarked Inventory, 
including confirmation regarding the owner of the underlying trademark. 
III. BORROWERS THAT DISTRIBUTE TRADEMARKED INVENTORY 
There may also be instances where a borrower distributes, but does not 
manufacture, Trademarked Inventory that is sold to it by the trademark owner 
for resale to third parties. A lender asked to lend against such Trademarked 
Inventory should undertake due diligence here as well. The borrower many 
times will be party to a distribution agreement with the trademark owner. The 
agreement may grant to the borrower a distribution right that is exclusive or 
non-exclusive, contain territorial boundaries, and grant to the borrower a 
license to use the trademark owner’s trademark in connection with the 
display, marketing and sale of the Trademarked Inventory. A lender should 
review the distribution agreement to determine: (i) the term of the agreement, 
(ii) the borrower’s distribution territory, (iii) the borrower’s ability to assign 
the agreement, (iv) the events that may trigger the termination of the 
agreement by either the trademark owner or borrower, (v) the right or 
obligation of the trademark owner to repurchase (or for the borrower to 
require the trademark owner to repurchase) any Trademarked Inventory upon 
the termination or expiration of the agreement, and (vi) the ability of the 
borrower to sell Trademarked Inventory after termination or expiration. 
To address any deficiencies in the underlying distribution agreement, a 
lender may wish to pursue a direct agreement with the trademark owner. The 
items addressed in such an agreement would be similar to those in the case 
of a borrower that manufactures Trademarked Inventory, including (i) the 
territory into which the Trademarked Inventory can be sold, (ii) the lender’s 
receipt of notice of any default under the distribution agreement and right to 
cure such default, (iii) the trademark owner’s right to repurchase (or the 
borrower’s right to require the trademark owner to repurchase) Trademarked 
Inventory, (iv) the price at which any Trademarked Inventory would be 
repurchased by the trademark owner, and (v) the payment of the repurchase 
price directly to the lender, without offset against amounts owing by the 
borrower to the trademark owner. As noted above, it may not always be 
possible for the lender to obtain such an agreement due to the trademark 
owner’s unwillingness, the perceived cost, or the borrower’s concern that 
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requesting such an agreement might jeopardize its business relationship with 
the trademark owner. The discussion that follows addresses the lender’s 
analysis in instances where the lender does not obtain such an agreement. 
A. Trademark Concerns 
The trademark analysis is more streamlined when the borrower is a 
distributor, as opposed to a manufacturer. As noted above, a purchaser who 
merely stocks, displays, and resells a product under the trademark owner’s 
trademark does not violate the Lanham Act. So long as a first sale has 
occurred, and the goods are sold in an unaltered state (such that no material 
difference exists), trademark liability should not attach when the goods are 
resold. 
Whether a first sale has occurred is seemingly a question of contract. 
The terms of the agreement may provide when title to the Trademarked 
Inventory passes from the trademark owner to the borrower. If it does, then 
the contract term is the logical reference as to when a first sale has occurred.62 
Assuming that title has passed from the trademark owner to the borrower no 
later than the time the Trademarked Inventory has been received by the 
borrower, a trademark owner would be hard pressed to assert that a first sale 
has not yet occurred after the inventory is in the borrower’s possession. 
As noted above, the trademark owner would also have the ability to 
contest the applicability of the first sale doctrine if the Trademarked 
Inventory had been repackaged or modified from the state in which it was 
received. A lender should take steps to confirm that the products the borrower 
sells have not been altered in any manner, such as splitting the goods into 
smaller lots or components, or repackaging the goods to meet specific 
customer needs. Any of these actions potentially could cause the sales to be 
                                                                                                                           
 
62 See, e.g., Italverde Trading, Inc. v. Four Bills of Lading, 485 F. Supp. 2d 187, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (holding that a determination whether goods seized by a customs broker were seized after a “first 
sale” depended on whether title to the goods had previously passed from the licensor-seller to the 
consignee-distributor); McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 812 (M.D. Tenn. 
2000) (plaintiff could not halt unauthorized sale of Beanie Babies toys from franchisee, even if 
unauthorized by franchisor, when the sale to the franchisee had been authorized and title passed). 
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subject to claims of trademark infringement if the distribution agreement is 
no longer in effect.63 
It bears noting that at least one court has viewed the post-termination 
sale by a distributor to constitute trademark infringement, even though the 
goods were genuine. Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Caitac Int’l, Inc.64 
involved an action by Citizens, a manufacturer of jeans, against Caitac, a 
distributor of Citizens’ jeans in Japan. Citizens alleged breach of contract and 
trademark infringement where Caitac continued to sell Citizens’ jeans in 
Japan following Citizens’ termination of its distribution agreement with 
Caitac due to Caitac’s failure to satisfy minimum volume requirements. The 
distribution agreement contained explicit terms that precluded Caitac from 
selling the jeans once the agreement was terminated. 
The jury found in favor of Citizens, and a portion of the verdict included 
more than $2 million in damages reflecting the revenues received by Caitac 
due to its post-termination sales. The jury allocated this amount solely to the 
trademark infringement claim. The appellate court affirmed the jury’s 
verdict, including the dollar amount awarded and its finding of trademark 
infringement. Citing the Ryan decision, the court held that: 
[u]nless a contract specifically permits a posttermination sale of inventory, if a 
former licensee were permitted to sell off its inventory over an indefinite period 
of time after termination of the license, the expiration date would have little force 
or meaning. The licensee could create a large surplus and give itself a de facto 
extension of the license.65 
Following the reasoning of the courts in Ryan and Bill Blass, the court 
concluded that Caitac assumed the risk that if it kept its inventory level too 
high, it might not be able to sell the goods in the event the distribution 
agreement was terminated. 
Viewing this decision in light of the first sale doctrine and the ability to 
resell unaltered goods, it does not appear that the court in Citizens v. Caitac 
invoked the correct legal basis to find liability. There was no dispute that 
Caitac had purchased the inventory from Citizens or that Caitac had altered 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 In addition, a distributor can be liable for trademark infringement if it continues to hold itself out 
as an authorized reseller or distributor of the licensor’s products once the distribution agreement has been 
terminated. See infra note 67. In cases where the borrower uses the licensor’s name in its business, this 
may necessitate that the borrower change its legal or trade name. 
64 2010 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6194 (Cal. App. Aug. 3, 2010). 
65 Id. at *19 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
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the goods in any manner. As such, the first sale doctrine should have 
precluded a finding of trademark infringement. A more appropriate basis for 
assessing liability would have been a breach of the distribution agreement 
which prohibited post-termination sales of the jeans. Indeed, in another 
California case involving the same plaintiff that was decided prior to Citizens 
v. Caitac, the California appellate court appears to have stated the rule 
correctly: 
Once the manufacturer has sold its goods to a distributor, the manufacturer can 
have no control over the retailers to whom the distributor resells the goods. If the 
manufacturer wishes to retain this control, it can best do so by means of its contract 
with its distributors. Even then, the manufacturer’s remedy is generally against its 
distributor for breach of contract; the manufacturer can only pursue the retailer if 
the retailer maliciously induced the breach.66 
B. Breach of Contract 
A lender should determine during the due diligence process the rights 
available to the borrower after termination and whether those rights include 
a sell-off period for Trademarked Inventory. If continued sales are restricted, 
then the borrower’s post-termination sale of Trademarked Inventory may 
constitute a breach of the underlying distribution agreement and give rise to 
a claim for damages or injunctive relief. 
A distribution agreement can address the borrower’s ability to make 
post-termination sales in a number of manners. For example, the agreement 
may prohibit all post-termination sales. Alternatively, the agreement may 
provide the trademark owner the obligation or right to repurchase 
Trademarked Inventory, and afford the borrower the ability to sell any 
Trademarked Inventory not repurchased. In either of these circumstances, it 
is apparent whether post-termination sales would be permitted. However, the 
possibility also exists that the agreement is silent regarding the borrower’s 
ability to sell Trademarked Inventory after termination. This last alternative 
presents an interesting question regarding the borrower’s rights. Citizens v. 
Caitac suggests that such sales should not be permitted, relying on the 
reasoning of the courts in Bill Blass and Ryan. However, the reasoning in 
                                                                                                                           
 
66 Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 464–65 (Cal. App. 
2009), disapproved on other grounds, Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct. of Orange Cty., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
741 (Cal. 2011). 
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those cases—that the borrower assumes the risk if it keeps its inventory at 
too high a level—may not apply where a distribution agreement is at issue. 
In both Bill Blass and Ryan, a first sale had not yet occurred within the 
meaning of the Lanham Act. In contrast, when Trademarked Inventory 
purchased by a distributor is resold without alteration, the trademark owner 
does not have the ability to restrict future sales based on the Lanham Act. If 
the trademark owner wishes to prohibit future sales, then it is incumbent on 
the trademark owner to limit such sales in the underlying contract. Absent 
such a restriction, the borrower’s continued sale of Trademarked Inventory 
does not breach any contract term. Without the protections of the Lanham 
Act—which should not apply—there should not be a basis to restrict such 
sales. 
If continued sales are permitted, however, the borrower will likely need 
to take steps to make clear it is not an authorized distributor. Distribution 
agreements customarily provide that in the event of a termination, the former 
distributor may no longer hold itself out as an authorized distributor or use 
any trademarks of the trademark owner in connection with the promotion and 
sale of Trademarked Inventory. A borrower that breaches these provisions 
can be subject to both a breach of contract claim as well as trademark 
infringement because it is seeking to trade off the trademark owner’s 
goodwill by suggesting an official association with or endorsement by the 
trademark owner.67 In light of these provisions, a lender should monitor the 
post-termination conduct of the borrower to remove references to the 
trademark owner’s trademarks in its marketing and sale of Trademarked 
Inventory so as to avoid potential trademark liability. 
C. Tortious Interference with Contract 
A trademark owner could also attempt to pursue a direct claim against 
the lender based on tortious interference with contract. “One who 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 See, e.g., Bel Canto Design, Ltd. v. MSS HiFi, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(preliminary injunction granted where defendant, a former authorized distributor of plaintiff’s products, 
represented itself to be affiliated with and endorsed by plaintiff); Stormor, a Division of Fuqua Indus., 
Inc. v. Johnson, 587 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Mich. 1984) (preliminary injunction granted on grounds of 
trademark infringement where defendant held himself out as an authorized distributor of plaintiff’s storm 
doors, including use of plaintiff’s promotional literature that had been stamped with the defendant’s 
name). 
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intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract . . . 
between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third 
person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the 
pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to 
perform the contract.”68 The elements of a state-law claim of tortious 
interference typically include: 
(1) improper action or wrongful conduct by the defendant without privilege; 
(2) the defendant acted purposely and with malice with the intent to injure; (3) the 
defendant induced a breach of contractual obligations. . . and (4) the defendant’s 
tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.69 
Of particular importance are the “malice” and “privilege” elements. Malice 
exists where the defendant’s conduct arises from an unauthorized 
interference without legal justification or excuse, or that the defendant acted 
without privilege or exercise of its own economic interest.70 
There does not appear to be any decisional case law involving a claim 
of tortious interference with contract against a lender seeking to liquidate its 
borrower’s inventory. However, there is authority that generally supports the 
view that a lender that is acting to enforce its security interest has a legitimate 
business purpose whose conduct is privileged.71 These cases may suggest 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 Gossard v. Adia Services, Inc., 120 F.3d 1229, 1231 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 766). 
69 Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Zip Wireless Prods. Inc., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1287 (N.D. Ga. 2010). 
The specific elements may differ among jurisdictions, and in certain jurisdictions, privileged conduct is 
an affirmative defense to the claim. 
70 Id. See also Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Cosmetic Gallery, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1237 (D.N.J. 1994), 
aff’d, 85 F.3d 612 (3d Cir. 1996); John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Pete-N-Larry’s Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1020, 1029 
(W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
71 See, e.g., Noble Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Central, LLC, 543 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2008) (perfected 
secured party that foreclosed its security interest was not liable to unperfected secured party for tortious 
interference with contractual relationship even though it may have known of the unperfected security 
interest); Energy Acquisition Corp. v. Millennium Energy Fund, L.L.C., 611 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1165 (D. 
Colo. 2009) (holding that secured creditor was authorized to hold mortgage pursuant to terms of credit 
agreement and its failure to release the lien created thereby did not constitute tortious interference); 
Daimler Chrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Clemente, 668 S.E.2d 737, 753 (Ga. App. 2008) (Chrysler’s use of 
a financial keeper at troubled dealership was consistent with its rights as a secured creditor and constituted 
“privilege” that precluded a tortious interference claim by a customer of the dealership); Dalton 
Diversified, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 605 S.E.2d 892, 898 (Ga. App. 2004) (holding that lender’s actions 
regarding its security interest did not as a matter of law, constitute tortious interference). See also Zachary 
Newman & Anthony Ellis, Navigating the Nuances of Tortious Interference Claims, ABA SECTION OF 
LITIGATION B. TORTS J. (Summer 2011) (noting cases holding that lender’s actions against collateral 
constitute a legitimate business purpose and not “malice”), http://www.hahnhessen.com/uploads/39/doc/ 
2011_06_zgn_ae_navigatingnuances.pdf. 
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that a lender is privileged when it encourages the borrower to sell 
Trademarked Inventory in which the lender has a security interest so as to 
facilitate repayment of the obligations owing by the borrower to it. 
Even if not privileged, the trademark owner would also need to establish 
its damages. Damages are usually measured with respect to injury to the 
brand caused by a “fire sale” or other disposition where Trademarked 
Inventory is offloaded into the marketplace. If the borrower sells the product 
in the ordinary course of business to the same customers, in the same manner 
and for the same price as before termination of the distribution agreement, 
then the trademark owner would have difficulty proving that it suffered 
damages as a result of the borrower’s continued sales, whether or not the 
lender encouraged such sales. As a result, a lender should monitor the manner 
in which Trademarked Inventory is sold post-termination and, if possible, 
support an orderly liquidation. 
IV. IMPACT OF BANKRUPTCY ON TRADEMARK LICENSES 
The possibility of a bankruptcy of the borrower or the licensor also poses 
risks to a lender regarding the borrower’s ability to sell Trademarked 
Inventory after commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. 
A. Effect of Borrower’s Bankruptcy on License 
A bankruptcy filing by or against the borrower may limit its ability to 
assume a pre-existing license agreement based on principles of non-
bankruptcy law. Trademark licenses are generally considered to be executory 
contracts, because both the debtor and non-debtor have material obligations 
under the contracts that remain unperformed.72 Section 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code addresses the treatment of executory contracts in 
                                                                                                                           
 
72 The most widely adopted test for determining whether a contract is executory is the 
“Countryman” test. Under that test, a contract is executory if the “obligations of both the bankrupt and 
the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete the performance 
would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.” Vern Countryman, Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973). Courts regularly find the obligations 
contained in an intellectual property license (other than the obligation to pay) as sufficient to create an 
executory contract. Neil S. Hirshman, Michael G. Fatall & Peter M. Spingola, Assignability of Intellectual 
Property Licenses in Bankruptcy, 21 IPL Newsletter 11, 17 n.50 (Fall 2002), http://www.kirkland.com/ 
siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2512/Document1/IPLFall02.pdf. 
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bankruptcy. Section 365(a) allows a debtor, subject to court approval, to 
assume an executory contract. Section 365(f) allows a debtor, also subject to 
court approval, to assign an executory contract to a third party. These general 
principles are subject to Section 365(c) when the contract is an intellectual 
property license. 
Section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in relevant part: 
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired 
lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts 
assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if: 
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract 
or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity 
other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or 
lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and 
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment. . . .73 
Many courts considering executory intellectual property licenses, have 
viewed the reference to applicable non-bankruptcy law in Section 365(c) to 
include federal common law. Under federal common law, courts have held 
that the right to use intellectual property under a non-exclusive license is 
personal to the licensee and, as such, cannot be assigned absent the consent 
of the licensor.74 The bulk of decisional authority concerns non-exclusive 
licenses, the argument being that an exclusive license may be more akin to a 
sale of the underlying intellectual property, causing the license not to be 
personal in nature. While not entirely clear, an exclusive trademark license 
could also be deemed personal to the licensee given the quality control 
aspects that are inherent in most trademark licenses.75 
The language of Section 365(c) has resulted in three separate tests 
employed by federal courts to determine whether a licensor must consent to 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2006) (emphasis added). 
74 In re N.C.P. Mktg., Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230, 236 (D. Nev. 2005), aff’d, 279 Fed. Appx. 561 
(9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, N.C.P. Mktg. Group, Inc. v. B.G. Star Prod., Inc., 556 U.S. 1145 (2009) 
(non-exclusive trademark license); see also In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 B.R. 300 (D. 
Del. 2001) (non-exclusive copyright license); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 
1999), cert. dismissed, Catapult Entm’t, Inc. v. Perlman, 120 S. Ct. 369 (1999) (non-exclusive patent). 
75 Hirshman, Fatall, and Spingola, supra note 72, at 17 n.32 (“there are strong arguments that 
trademark licenses are likely never assignable without the licensor’s consent, because the licensor always 
maintains its duty to control the quality of the goods and services sold under the licensed mark, whether 
the license at issue is exclusive or nonexclusive”). 
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a licensee’s assumption of an executory license agreement in bankruptcy. 
Each of the tests is discussed below. 
1. Hypothetical Test 
The Third, Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a debtor 
cannot assume a non-exclusive executory contract where applicable non-
bankruptcy law restricts the ability to assign the contract, even if the debtor 
does not intend to assign the contract.76 These courts reason that the use of 
“or” in the references to “assignment or assumption” in Section 365(c) 
should be read as disjunctive. Therefore, the debtor can neither assume nor 
assign an executory contract such as a license agreement if the right to assign 
the contract is limited by applicable non-bankruptcy law. This is commonly 
referred to as the “hypothetical test,” because the debtor is barred from 
assuming the license agreement regardless of whether the debtor has any 
actual intent to assign the contract to a third party. 
2. Actual Test 
The First and Fifth Circuits (and a number of bankruptcy courts in other 
circuits) have adopted a different approach. Assumption of an executory 
contract such as a license agreement is precluded only if the debtor actually 
intends to assign the contract to a third party, such that the licensor will be 
required to accept performance from a party other than the debtor with whom 
it originally contracted.77 Hence the reference to the “actual test.” 
Both the hypothetical and actual tests were discussed briefly by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices Kennedy and Breyer in connection with the Supreme 
Court’s denial of certiorari in N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc. v. BG Star 
Productions, Inc.78 In a statement by the two Justices, they acknowledged the 
relative merits of both tests. They noted that the hypothetical test, while true 
to the statutory text, sacrifices sound bankruptcy policy by possibly 
undermining a debtor-in-possession’s ability to effectively reorganize and 
                                                                                                                           
 
76 In re West Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 1988); In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257 (4th 
Cir. 2004); In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999); In re James Cable Partners, 
27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994). 
77 Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 521 
U.S. 1120 (1997); In re Mirant Corp., 440 F.3d 238, 251 (5th Cir. 2006). 
78 556 U. S. 1145 (2009). 
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providing a windfall to a licensor who would otherwise be unable to renege 
on its agreement outside bankruptcy. They further noted that the actual test, 
in contrast, aligns with sound bankruptcy policy “at the cost of departing 
from at least one interpretation of the plain text of the law.” The Justices 
nonetheless acknowledged that the other legal issues presented in N.C.P. did 
not make that case ideal for resolving the “significant question” raised by the 
split of authority. 
3. Footstar Test 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has 
adopted a third approach which permits assumption of the contract by the 
debtor-in-possession, and not a bankruptcy trustee. Rather than focus on the 
term “or,” the court in In re Footstar, Inc.79 instead focused on the use of the 
term “trustee” in the introductory language of Section 365(c). The court 
reasoned that the Section does not state “debtor” or “debtor-in-possession” 
and that the Bankruptcy Code does not define “trustee” to be synonymous 
with those terms. As such, the court concluded that the term “trustee” should 
not be substituted for “debtor-in-possession” in Section 365(c)(1). Under 
Footstar, no issue should arise if the contract is assumed by the debtor-in-
possession, because it would not require that the licensor accept performance 
from an entity other than the debtor.80 Assumption of the executory contract 
would require the third party’s consent only if the trustee were the assuming 
party. 
4. Suggestions Due to Non-Uniform Authority 
The disparate rules among courts poses several risks to both a borrower 
and its lender with respect to Trademarked Inventory. If the court 
administering the borrower’s bankruptcy proceeding follows the 
hypothetical test, then the borrower and its lender may not have the legal 
ability to sell Trademarked Inventory post-bankruptcy unless the licensor 
consents to the borrower’s assumption of the license in bankruptcy. A 
borrower may be able to negotiate provisions to its license agreement to 
mitigate this risk. Those provisions include: 
                                                                                                                           
 
79 323 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
80 Id. at 576. 
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● Assignment: A provision that permits for assignments by the 
borrower. 
● Termination Provision: A provision that states that the license 
cannot be terminated in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy so long as the 
debtor-in-possession continues to perform under the agreement. 
● Assumption: A provision that states that in the event the borrower 
files under Chapter 11, the borrower may assume the license, and 
nothing in Section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code may be used by 
the licensor to prevent such assignment. In light of Footstar, a 
possible additional provision would allow a trustee to assume the 
license in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.81 
Whether these provisions are or can be included may be determined by the 
relative sophistication of the parties or the negotiating power (or lack thereof) 
of the borrower. If absent, the borrower could evaluate as part of any possible 
bankruptcy filing, whether the filing might be appropriate in a jurisdiction in 
which the law permits a debtor to assume an executory license without the 
licensor’s consent (i.e., the “actual” or Footstar tests). Until resolution of the 
split by the U.S. Supreme Court, this could afford some comfort to the 
borrower and its lender that the borrower’s ability to sell Trademarked 
Inventory would not be jeopardized solely due to the borrower’s bankruptcy. 
B. Effect of Licensor’s Bankruptcy on License 
The licensor’s bankruptcy poses a separate issue regarding the 
continued validity of a trademark license. As noted above, executory 
contracts can either be rejected or assumed by a debtor in bankruptcy, and 
intellectual property license agreements are commonly considered to be 
executory contracts. If the licensor files for bankruptcy (or an involuntary 
petition is filed against it), the borrower and its lender face the risk that the 
licensor might reject the executory license agreement. Such action could 
preclude the borrower from continuing to manufacture or sell any 
Trademarked Inventory. In addition, even in instances where the lender 
successfully obtained a licensor agreement directly with the licensor, that 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 See generally Barbara Rabinovitz, Circuit split over IP licenses in bankruptcies vexing issue, 
NEW ENGLAND IN-HOUSE (July 31, 2009), http://newenglandinhouse.com/2009/07/31/circuit-split-over-
ip-licenses-in-bankruptcies-vexing-issue. 
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agreement could also be deemed to be executory, in which case it too could 
be rejected by the licensor. 
The issues regarding the licensor’s rejection of executory intellectual 
property licenses were highlighted in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond 
Metal Finishers, Inc.82 The court in that case held that a debtor-licensor’s 
rejection and breach of a non-exclusive patent license denied the licensee any 
right to use the licensed technology. The court determined that Section 
365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code provided only a damages remedy for the non-
debtor licensee and not a specific performance remedy.83 The court reasoned 
that the lack of a specific performance remedy meant that a licensee could 
not “seek to retain its contract rights in the technology by specific 
performance even if that remedy would ordinarily be available upon breach 
of this type of contract.”84 The court then concluded that where the debtor 
rejected the executory contract, the licensee lost its rights under the license, 
such that rejection of the contract constituted termination of the license. 
In response to Lubrizol, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code by 
adding Section 365(n) which expressly permits intellectual property 
licensees to retain their rights to use the licensed property if certain statutory 
conditions are satisfied. However, Congress omitted trademarks from the 
Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “intellectual property,”85 which has the 
effect of excluding trademark licenses from the protections afforded under 
Section 365(n). There does not appear to be a clear and singular reason why 
                                                                                                                           
 
82 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). 
83 The court relied on the legislative history regarding Section 365(g), noting that the House Report 
“makes clear that the purpose of the provision is to provide only a damages remedy for the non-bankrupt 
party.” Id. at 1048. Section 365(g) provides “Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this 
section, the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such 
contract or lease (1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this section or under a plan 
confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, immediately before the date of the filing of the 
petition; or (2) if such contract or lease has been assumed under this section or under a plan confirmed 
under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title (A) if before such rejection the case has not been converted 
under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title, at the time of such rejection; or (B) if before such rejection 
the case has been converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title (i) immediately before the date 
of such conversion, if such contract or lease was assumed before such conversion; or (ii) at the time of 
such rejection, if such contract or lease was assumed after such conversion.” 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006). 
84 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
85 The Bankruptcy Code defines “intellectual property” to mean a “(A) trade secret; (B) invention, 
process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C) patent application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of 
authorship protected under title 17; or (F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17. . . .” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(35A) (2006). 
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Congress chose to treat trademarks differently than other types of intellectual 
property. Some courts and commentators have suggested that it is because 
trademarks are unique among intellectual property and the need to maintain 
quality control is paramount.86 Others have suggested that Congress merely 
desired additional time to evaluate how trademarks should be treated under 
the Bankruptcy Code, and the need to act dissipated over time given the 
substantial improvement that Section 365(n) provided over Lubrizol for most 
types of intellectual property. 
Notwithstanding the Congressional response to Lubrizol, the decision 
has been criticized over the years as incorrectly concluding that Section 
365(g) had the effect of terminating the intellectual property license. In 
December 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC,87 
became the first federal appellate court to hold in favor of a trademark 
licensee and permit a licensee to continue to manufacture and distribute 
trademarked goods following a bankrupt licensor’s rejection of an executory 
license agreement under Section 365. 
Sunbeam involved a debtor, Lakewood, that had licensed certain 
intellectual property to Chicago American Manufacturing (“CAM”). The 
license permitted CAM to make and sell box fans under Lakewood’s patents 
bearing Lakewood’s trademarks. Due to Lakewood’s financial condition, 
CAM was reluctant to make investments to produce the number of fans 
Lakewood estimated would be needed for the 2009 season. In response, the 
parties agreed that CAM would be permitted to sell any excess Lakewood 
box fans manufactured by CAM during the 2009 season that Lakewood did 
not otherwise purchase. After the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy against 
Lakewood, the trustee sold Lakewood’s assets to Sunbeam, including the 
patents and trademarks that had been licensed to CAM. As a condition to 
purchase, Sunbeam required that the trustee reject the license agreement with 
CAM. Notwithstanding the rejection, CAM continued to use the patents and 
trademarks, and Sunbeam brought suit against CAM for infringement. The 
bankruptcy court held in favor of CAM based upon considerations of equity, 
acknowledging that Section 365(n) did not apply to the trademark license 
                                                                                                                           
 
86 See, e.g., James M. Wilton & Andrew G. Devore, Trademark Licensing in the Shadow of 
Bankruptcy, 68 BUS. LAW. 739, 756–57 (2013) (and authorities cited therein). 
87 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
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(although it did apply to the patent license). Sunbeam appealed directly to the 
Seventh Circuit. 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, but 
disagreed that equity warranted such a conclusion. Instead, the court took 
direct issue with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Lubrizol and, in particular, 
that court’s reading of Section 365(g). Writing for the court, Chief Judge 
Easterbrook first reasoned that Section 365(n), while passed in response to 
Lubrizol, did not validate the Lubrizol court’s reasoning. The Seventh Circuit 
noted that the Senate committee report on the bill omitted trademarks from 
the definition of intellectual property “to allow more time for study, not to 
approve Lubrizol.”88 
Having determined that Congress did not intend to codify Lubrizol as it 
pertained to trademarks, the court then questioned the Fourth Circuit’s 
reading of Section 365(g). The court in Lubrizol equated rejection of a 
contract with avoidance powers. The Seventh Circuit declined to follow this 
determination. Relying on the text of Section 365(g)—which provides that a 
rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach of contract—the court 
concluded that a non-debtor licensee retains all rights in bankruptcy as it 
would have outside of bankruptcy. “[R]ejection is not the functional 
equivalent of a rescission, rendering void the contract and requiring that the 
parties be put back in the positions they occupied before the contract was 
formed. It merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform.”89 
The Seventh Circuit’s reading of Section 365(g) has not met universal 
support. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re Tempnology90 
recently reversed a decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First 
Circuit that applied the reasoning of Sunbeam in holding for the aggrieved 
licensee. The case involved a licensee (“Mission Products”) that had an 
exclusive right to distribute certain branded products within the United States 
and a non-exclusive license to use the licensor’s marks. The licensor 
terminated the license which triggered a two-year wind-down period for 
Mission Products to sell the remaining inventory. The licensor filed for 
bankruptcy prior to the end of such period and promptly terminated the 
license upon filing its bankruptcy petition. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel 
                                                                                                                           
 
88 Id. at 375. 
89 Id. at 377 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018). 
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first noted that Section 365(n) did not protect Mission Products’ interest in 
the trademarks.91 However, rather than require that Mission Products cease 
selling the trademarked inventory, the court applied Sunbeam. The 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel found that Section 365(g) deems the licensor’s 
rejection of the contract in bankruptcy to be a breach of contract and, outside 
of bankruptcy, a breach of contract would not terminate the licensee’s rights 
to sell the trademarked inventory.92 
The First Circuit rejected the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision 
(and the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Sunbeam) regarding Mission 
Products’ continued right to sell the trademarked inventory.93 The court 
noted that rejection of the contract did not eliminate all rights of a licensee as 
the licensee retained its claim for damages. Moreover, the court noted that 
“the approach taken by Sunbeam entirely ignores the residual enforcement 
burden it would impose on the debtor just as the [Bankruptcy] Code 
otherwise allows the debtor to free itself from executory burdens.”94 The 
court reasoned that if Mission Products could still perform the license, then 
the licensor would be forced to continue to take steps to ensure the quality 
and integrity of its product—or risk the license being deemed a naked license 
and lose the value of its trademark—all of which is contrary to the 
Bankruptcy Code’s “fresh start options” for a debtor. 
Sunbeam and Tempnology create an obvious split of authority regarding 
the interpretation of Section 365(g) and the effect that a debtor-licensor’s 
rejection of an executory trademark license has vis-à-vis the licensee. In light 
of these divergent decisions, it is possible that the Supreme Court could 
address the issue. Moreover, Congress may revisit how a licensor’s 
trademark license should be treated and whether trademarks should be 
included within the definition of “intellectual property.” Either resolution is 
likely some time away. 
A lender could protect its interest by investigating the financial 
condition of the licensor to evaluate whether there is a credible risk of its 
bankruptcy during the life of the credit facility with the borrower. The lender 
might also be able to preserve the borrower’s (and lender’s) right to sell 
                                                                                                                           
 
91 In re Tempnology, 559 B.R. 809, 822–23 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
92 Id. 
93 The First Circuit upheld the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s decision that trademark licenses fell 
outside the scope of Section 365(n). In re Tempnology, 879 F.3d at 401. 
94 Id. at 404. 
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Trademarked Inventory if the license were rejected through one of the 
following methods: 
● Security Interest in Licensed Trademark: The borrower could 
require that the licensor grant to it a security interest in the 
underlying trademarks. While this would not provide any 
assurance that the borrower could continue to use the licensed 
marks pursuant to the license agreement, it would provide the 
borrower a secured claim in bankruptcy in the event that the 
underlying license agreement is rejected. However, the ability to 
obtain a security interest may be limited, whether due to the relative 
negotiating positions of the borrower and licensor, covenants that 
the licensor may have with its own lenders, and the fact that the 
licensor may license the mark to various third parties.95 
● Covenant Not to Sue: The borrower may seek to add a covenant 
into its license agreement that, if the licensor rejects the license 
agreement in bankruptcy, the licensor will not sue the licensee for 
infringement. It is not clear whether a covenant not to sue would 
continue to be effective in a jurisdiction endorsing Lubrizol—
which has been interpreted to equate rejection with avoidance—or 
be enforceable notwithstanding Lubrizol as a matter of bankruptcy 
policy. 
● Structuring License as a Non-Executory Contract: While a non-
executory contract is not subject to rejection, this may be difficult 
to achieve in most license arrangements due to typical quality 
controls that obligate continued performance by the licensee and 
oversight by the licensor. A borrower may have success in the very 
limited context of a perpetual, prepaid license obtained as part of 
an acquisition, although even in that context, great care would need 
to be taken to structure the license so that the contract would not be 
deemed to be executory.96 
                                                                                                                           
 
95 Wilton & Devore, supra note 86, at 779. 
96 See, e.g., In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1470 (2011) 
(holding that grant of exclusive license in conjunction of sale of business did not constitute an executory 
contract because the asset purchase agreement and license were an integrated contract and purchase had 
substantially performed by paying the purchase price). See also Wilton & Devore, supra note 86, at 777–
78 (noting that to be deemed non-executory, the license would need to be incorporated as an integrated 
contract with the purchase agreement that documents the sale of the products or business unit, and the 
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● Bankruptcy Remote Entity: The risk of rejection would be reduced 
if the licensor in the transaction is not an operating company, but a 
holding company whose sole purpose is to hold the trademarks of 
an affiliate (and cannot incur any debt), which are licensed to both 
the affiliate and to third parties.97 While a borrower may not be able 
to facilitate such a transaction as a mere licensee, a lender could 
take comfort if such a structure already existed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lending against Trademarked Inventory poses risks to a lender in the 
event of termination of a license agreement or distribution agreement, as 
termination may have the effect of preventing liquidation of such inventory 
following termination. Only through appropriate due diligence can a lender 
understand the borrower’s contractual rights to sell Trademarked Inventory. 
Good due diligence will allow a lender to better quantify the risks 
surrounding the sale of Trademarked Inventory, and to determine whether 
(and at what price) the lender can liquidate such inventory. 
                                                                                                                           
 
license should recite “the parties’ intention that the license is not an executory contract and provide that 
default by the licensee, including default for the licensee’s failure to maintain the quality of trademarked 
goods or services, is not a material default that permits the licensor to terminate the license of the 
trademark”). 
97 The remote entity’s articles of incorporation and by-laws (or similar organizational documents) 
should (i) limit the entity’s authority to engage in any business (other than licensing the trademarks); 
(ii) prohibit the entity from incurring debt or otherwise encumbering its assets; and (iii) prevent the entity 
from filing a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing 
Intellectual Property and Technology from the Financially-Troubled or Startup Company: Prebankruptcy 
Strategies to Minimize the Risk in a Licensee’s Intellectual Property and Technology Investment, 55 BUS. 
LAW. 1649, 1690 (2000). 
